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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WILMITH J. REES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MURRAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, a corporate body, and
WENDELL C. DAY, EARL
HEALY, DAVID B. McCLEERY,
PAULS. ROSE, LAWRENCE P.
PARRY, J. EASTON PARRATT
and VARIAN MORTENSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Civil No. 8586

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appel1ant in her brief states in a little over
three pages how this case arose. She then goes on
under four different sub-headings for an additional five pages with an argumentative statement of
the case. As this is an appeal from a summary judgment, the factual issues should be reviewed in light
of the principles applicable to such judgments. As
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
taken practically verbatim from the Federal Rules
1
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of Civil Procedure, a recent statement of the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit might be taken
as a guide. In that case, Killpack v. National Old
Line Insurance Company, 229 F2d 851, ( CA 10,
1956) the Court said:
"Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., authorized the entry
of a summary judgment when it affirmatively appears from the pleadings, admissions
affidavits, depositions and exhibits on fil~
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Since this procedure was not designed as a substitute for the regular trial
of cases, however, it should be invoked with
due caution and all substantial doubts concerning the existence of a disputed material
issue of fact should be resolved against the
moving party after a careful scrutiny of the
record.
"A review of the pleadings and supporting affidavits and exhibits in this case reveals the existence of several conflicts. A detailed discussion of the points of difference
is not necessary, however, since in our opinion none involves an issue upon which the
outcome of this litigation depends. The decision is here controlled by unchallenged
documentary evidence."
That same Court a few years earlier in Brodr
crick Trood P1·oducts Co. Y. C'nited States, 195 F2d
.!;~:3, (CA 10, 1952), said:
"But if it affirmatively appears from
the. ple~din~s, admissions or d~positions 8:nd
affidavits, If any, that there Is no genuine
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issue as to any material fact upon which the
outcome of the 1itiga tion depends, the case
is appropriate for disposition by summary
judgment and the court should enter such
judgment."
As pointed out by Professor Moore in his Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., § 56.04, et seq., allegations
in pleadings may be pierced by affidavits, depositions and other documentary evidence and summary judgment entered for the defendent. Professor Moore analogizes a summary judgment to a motion for a directed verdict, not to a demurrer as
Appellant suggests. It is submitted that application
of these principies is dispositive of the issues here.
It is quite true that there are some conflicts in the
respective affidavits but these conflicts are not material to the basic issues upon which the decision
of the trial court was based. It is submitted these
conflicts involve window-dressing items entwined
around the essential undisputed facts in such a
fashion as to provoke sympathies for a poor school
teacher as against a hard-hearted school board.
What are these undisputed material facts?
( 1) Beginning with the school year 19491950, Appellant was employed by the defendant
Board of Education for a term of one year as a
teacher in the Murray City High School. (R 6)
(2) Similar one year contracts were entered
into between the Board and Appellant for the school
3
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years 1950-1951, 1951-1952, 1952-1953 and 19531954. (R 7-10)
(3) Under date of March 29, 1954, the Murray Board of Education notified Appellant that
it was not planning to enter into a contract with her
£o:i: the school year 1954-1955. (R 39)
( 4) On May 17, 1954, in response to request
by her for a statement as to its reasons for not
entering in to a new contract, the Board advised her:

"The Board, at its regular meeting on
May 13, 1954, directed me to notify you that
its action concerning renewing your contract
was taken because the Board felt that your
outside interests and activities and your general attitude were unduly interfering with
your duties as a teacher at the Murray High
School". (R 41)
In this same letter the Board offered to hold
a special meeting on May 25, 1954, to hear her, but
was advised by her counsel that he would not permit
her to appear and the meeting was, therefore, canceled. ( R 63)
( 5) No further action has been taken by the
Board in connection with the matter. On July 8,
1954, Appellant filed this action against the Board,
the individual men1bers thereof, the high school
principal under whom she served and the Superintendent of the Murray City Schools, claiming on her
first cause of action a breach of contract and on her
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second cause of action, interference with contractua] relations. (R 1-5)
Based on the pleadings, affidavits, documentary
exhibits and the depositions on file, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all of
the defendants on the first cause of action and as to
the Board of Education and its individual members
on the second cause of action (R 70-73), leaving
to be tried only the claim of interference with contractual relations as against the principal and the
superintendent of schools. This appeal is from that
Order.
Such other facts as are relevant to the material
issues will be discussed in dealing with the issues
raised in Appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF POIN:TS
I. THE MURRAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
DID NOT BREACH ANY CONTRACT WITH MRS.
REES.
A. Appellant was not discharged.

B.
ployment.

Appellant had no contractual right to re-em-

C. The Murray Board of Education had no power
to make an indefinite employment contract.
D. Any contract of the nature contended for by
Appellant extending beyond the school term was illusory
for want of mutuality of obligation.
E.

No such contract as contended by Appellant

existed.
5
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II. APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO A HEARING.
III. THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS.

ARGUMENT
I. THE MURRAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
DID NOT BREACH ANY CONTRACT WITH MRS.
REES.
A. Appellant was not discharged.

Appellant below and in her brief here has taken
the position that she was discharged or dismissed.
Such is not the case. All the defendant Board of
Education did was to decide not to renew her one
year con tract and so notified her. She served out
her time to the end of the school year and the Board
has paid her the full salary therefor as prescribed
by the written contract. The only contract between
the parties has been fully performed by both. It is
well settled that a failure to rehire or renew a
teacher's contract does not constitute a discharge or
dismissal. Jllarion v. Board of Education, 97 Cal.
606, 32 P 643 ( 1893) ; State v. Tranarriaker, 281 P
2d 846, (Wash., 1955); People c.t~ rel. Fursman v.
Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 NE 158, LRA 1917 E.
1069; 47 Am. Jur. 387, Schools, §125.
It is equally well established that no Board of
Education can be forced to enter into a contract 1
6
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with a teacher against the will of the majority of
the Board. State v. Wanamaker, supra. The leading
case on the power of a local school authority to determine for itself whether it will enter into or renew a contract of employment with a teacher is
People ex rel. Fursman v. Chicago, supra. In that
case an attack was made upon a rule of the Chicago
Board of Education adopted by it just before the
commencement of the school year 1915 to the effect
that the Board would hire no teacher who was a
member of a trade union or a federation or association of trade unions. The court upheld the validity
of the rule stating:
" ... A new contract must be made each
year with such teachers as it desires to retain
in its employ. No person has a right to demand that he or she shall be employed as a
teacher. The Board has the absolute right to
decline to employ or to re-employ ·any applicant for any reason whatever or for no reason
at all. The Board is responsible for its action
only to the people of the city, from whom,
through the mayor, the members have received their appointments. It is no infringement upon the constitutional rights of anyone
for the board to decline to employ him as a
teacher in the schools, and it is immaterial
whether the reason for the refusal to employ
him is because the applicant is married or
unmarried, is of fair complexion or dark, is
or is not a member of a trades union, or
whether no reason is given for such refusal.
The board is not bound to give any reason
7
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for its action. It is free to contract with
whomsoever it chooses. Neither the Constitution nor the statute places any restriction upon
this right of the board to contract, and no one
has any grievance which the courts will recognize simply because the board of education
refuses to contract with him or her. Questions of policy are solely for the determination of the board, and when they have once
been determined by it the courts will not inquire into their propriety." (emphasis supplied)
In an earlier case on the same point, the Ohio
court in Frederick v. Ow~ns ( 1915) 35 Ohio C. C.
538, appeal denied, 116 NE 1085 stated:
" ... Neither the superintendent nor any
of his assistants nor any of the teachers have
any vested right in the positions that they
hold. The right to longer occupy those positions terminates at the end of the period for
which the appointment has been made, and
thereafter the right to continue therein depends upon the judgment of the superintendent and the board in so far as assistants and
teachers are concerned, and of the board alone
in so far as the superintendent is concerned.
It was necessary that this power of selection
- appointment and reappointment - should
be vested somewhere and the legislature saw
fit to vest it in the superintendent and in the
board of education ... "
'The same issue came before the Washington i
court a few years later and that court reached the
same result, following and citing the Illinois and
8
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Ohio cases and upholding a resolution of the Seattle
School Board not to hire or rehire any teachers who
were members of the American Federation of Teachers, Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the
American Federation of Teachers v. Sharples, 159
Wash. 424, 293 P. 994, 72 ALR 1215. The Court
said:
" ... The employment of teachers is a
matter of treaty or voluntary contract. Both
parties must consent and be mutually satisfied and agreed. On the part of each it is a
matter of choice and discretion. However,
though qualified, no teacher has the legal
right to teach in the schools until the directors willingly enter into a contract for that
purpose... "
A Board of Education, having made its decision of policy not to rehire a teacher, a court cannot
review such determination, People ex rel. Fursman
v. Chicago, supra; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112,
40 So. 297. As was said by the Ohio court in Frederick v. Owens, supra.
"The question here is, there being no
showing that any teacher appointed is competent to perform the duties of the position,
can the superintendent and the board of education be held to have abused their discretion
in making selections, because they selected
the ones they did instead of others who might
have been chosen? It being true that neither
the superintendent nor the board is required
by law to state the reasons to anyone for the
selections made, can the court enumerate cer9
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tain reasons as insufficient and then command the superintendent and the board of
education not to omit to appoint for those
stated reasons, and then punish them for contempt if they do so? ... It is difficult to conceive of anything that would be more certainly productive of confusion in practical application than the proposition that the courts
may state to public officers the various
grounds upon which they shall not determine
against appointing an applicant for a position under the control of such officers. This
doctrine extended to its logical result necessarily takes from the public officer very much
of the authority given him by law to make
the selectionsin question, and to that extent,
and without the slightest warrant of law,
passes this power over to the courts. We are
very clearly of opinion that nothing exists
in the statutes giving the courts any such
power. We think it would be quite as justifiable for the courts to undertake to regulate
all political appointments in the state by prescribing that different political affiliation
should not furnish sufficient ground for denying appointments, and then proceed to punish
the public officer who violated the order by
denying appointments on political grounds.;)
'The members of the board of education are
elected by the people. If the people make mistakes in their selection of men to fill these
important positions, the ballot box, and not
the courts, is the place to correct these errors."
I

This court has already recognized the prin·
ciple that in the absence of some provision in the
10
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contract of employment or some statutory restriction, an employer may discharge an employee at
any time or for any cause without liability. Karna
Held v. American Linen Supply Company, ______ Utah
______ , ______ P 2d ______ , decided February 8, 1957. This
court in Backman v. Bateman, 1 Utah 2d 153, 263
P 2d 561, has applied this same principle to boards
of education. Both the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Wolfe and the dissenting opinion of Justice
McDonough in that case recognize that absent any
legislative interdiction, a board of education might
in its discretion refuse to employ or retain in employment any application or teacher for whatever
reason its judgment might dictate. This court has
also pointed out that a citizen outraged by a determination of policy by a board of education has no
remedy in court, but has two alternatives:
"One is by petition to the board and the
other is by election of new members." Beard
v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P 2d
900 at 912; Allen v. Board of Education, 120
Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756.
B. Appellant had no contractual right to re-employment.

'To attempt to escape the inescapable conclusion
that it does not constitute a breach of contract to
fail to renew a contract, Appellant argues that there
was an implied "tenure clause" in her contract of
employment. Just what this tenure clause was sup11
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posed to be is not clear. In the portion of her brief
arguing that she had shown a "prima facie case"
for tenure, (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-18) it is indicated that the tenure she claims is that "there
could be no unilateral discharge without a thorough
investigation and hearing before the Board." (Appellant's brief, p. 14) The quotation from Appellant's deposition of Dr. Clove, the former Superin- ·
tendent of Murray Schools, appearing on page 15
of her brief, indicates the same thing. Appellant's
counsel, in questioning Dr. Clove as to what kind
of tenure he had referred to put the same interpretation in his question:
''Q: In other words, before a teacher
could be discharged, she would have to be discharged through some orderly dismissal procedure?" (Deposition of Dr. Clove, p. 15,
line 15)
Inasmuch as Appellant was not discharged, the
implied tenure clause thus derived by Appellant and
her counsel, would not be applicable to her case even
if it existed.
~
Since Appellant appears to be confused as to
the 1neaning of "tenure", it might be helpful to revil)YI briefly the tenure principle in the education
:~it)lc1. Tenure generally takes one of two forms: (a)
. \ p:·o:~.c~·iption against dis1nissal of a teacher, i.e.,
L~1at her en1ploy1nent be terminated before the end
of the con tract tern1, except for certain prescribed
12
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grounds and after a hearing, and (b) The establishment of a right to be retained in employment indefinitely, subject only to removal for certain enumerated causes and in a prescribed manner. See
47 Am. Jur., Schools, § 127 et seq. Both of these
types are norma1ly created by statute. No statute
creating either type of tenure is in effect in Utah,
and, as this court pointed out in Backman v. Bateman, supra, without such legislation mandate, a
Board of Education in its discretion may refuse to
hire or renew a contract for whatever reason its
judgment might dictate.
It is submitted that under the undisputed facts
of this case, there neither existed nor could exist
any contractual limitation on the discretion of the
Murray Board of Education.
C. The Murray Board of Education had no power
to make an indefinite employment contract.

'The Board of Education, being a creature of
the legislature, has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it and such implied powers as are
necessary to execute and carry into effect its express powers. Allen v. Board of Education, 120
Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756; Hansen v. Board· of Education, 101 Utah 15, 116 P 2d 936. There is nothing
expressly in the statute stating the Board's powers,
(53-6-20, U.C.A. 1953) with respect to the employment of teachers. Since the Board has the obligation
13
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to maintain the schools, it would have implied authority to make necessary contracts for employment
of teachers. There is nothing in that obligation,
however, which would make it necessary that those
contracts extend beyond the school term.
The only legislative provision with respect to
the duration of a teacher's contract was not adopted
by the Utah Legislature until the special session of
December, 1953. That provision, (now 53-4-14,
U.C.A., 1953), provides:
"Boards of education of local school districts may enter into written contracts for the
employment of personnel for terms not to
exceed five years, provided that nothing in
the terms of such contracts shall restrict the
power of such local boards to terminate such
contracts for cause at any time."
It is submitted that until that provision was
adopted, the Board of Education had no authority
to make a contract for more than the year to year
basis practiced in Mw·ray School District and in
other school districts of the state, let alone the lifetime and good behavior contract contended for by
plaintiff.
The history of the 1953 Act amply demonstrates
that it was intended as a grant of new power to the
Boards of Education - not a limitation on existing
implied powers of t11e Board.
The bill had its genesis in the report of the
14
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sixty-man Utah Public School Survey Commission
issued in February, 1953. On page 87 of that report
the commission recommended as follows:
"14. Necessary legislation should be
enacted to permit the local boards of education to adopt a po1icy of 'continuing contracts'
extending beyond a single year." (emphasis
supplied)
At page 272 of that report appears a model bill
drafted by the Commission to carry out its recommendations. That bill was approved and recommended to the Legislature by the Utah Legislative
Council as originally drafted. The Governor, in his
call of the Special Session, listed as among the items
to be covered at such Special Session the following:
"11. Legis1ation to permit employment
of school personnel upon a five-year tenure
by contract and to provide certain standard
terms for such contracts, placing certain limitations and restrictions on the boards and
contracting personnel."
The Governor, in his message to the Legislature at the opening of the Special Session stated,
among other things :
"I recommend the adoption of legislation
to permit school boards to enter into five-year
contracts with employees, subject to termination for cause at any time ... "
The Governor went on to suggest certain restrictions on activities of teachers, primarily di15
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rected toward curtailing their political activities.
(Message of Governor J. Bracken Lee, First Special
Session of the 30th Legislature, December 1, 1953,
p. xv of the Session Laws of 1953).
The bill, as originally drafted by the School
Su1·vey Comr.aission and recommended by the Legislative Council was adopted by the Legislature without change and bore this .title:
"AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BOARDS OF
EDUCATION OF LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS
MAY ENTER INTO \YRITTEN CONTRACTS ;
FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL
FOR TERMS OF XOT MORE THAN FIVE
YEARS ON COXDITION THAT SUCH CONTRACTS SHALL NOT RESTRICT THE POWER
OF LOCAL BOARDS TO TERMINATE SUCH
COXTRACTS FOR CAVSE AT AXY TIME."

It is significant that in discussing this proposed legislation, everyone concerned used the word
"permit". If the intent were to limit existing power
the verb used would have been "restrict" or one
\\·ith silnilar meaning. ''Permit'' clearly indicates
a grant of new authority, not a limitation on existing po\Vl'r. It is also significant that the Sixty Man
Comn1ission used the adjecth·e "necessary'' to describe th<' proposed legislation. Certainly if school
board~ already had the power to n1ake continuing
con tracts existing beyond a single school term, such
16
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legislation would not be characterized as necessary."
Clearly after this Act was passed, the Murray
School Board could not have entered into a lifetime
or good behavior contract of employment with Appellant as she apparently contends. Its power is
specifically limited to five years by the 1953 Act.
Yet, if a special grant of authority was "necessary"
to "permit" school boards to enter into five year contracts, a fortiori, legislation would have been necessary to allow a board to make a "lifetime and good
behavior" tenure contract before the 1953 Act. No
such statute exists. Therefore, any such contract as
Appellant claims is clearly ultra vires and void.
It is not contended as Appellant suggests that
the members of a board of education may not bind
their successors by employing a teacher for a period
extending beyond the term of office of the board
members. Such doctrine based on the historical distinction between governmental and proprietary activities (See Jacobberger v. School District No. 1,
256 P 652 Ore., 1927) is now generally recognized
as too great a limitation on the effectiveness of a
board's operations in view of the staggered terms
of board members. To meet the needs of an efficiently operated school system, the courts have modified this ancient doctrine to allow contracts for a
reasonable period of time. (See annotations at 70
ALR 802 and 149 ALR 343) These cases in up17
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holding contracts determined to be for a reasonable
time have all dealt with contracts with definite
terms. The contract Appellant claims has no such
definite term. She claims a teacher having "professional tenure" is employed until the age of 65 unless
removed for cause and after full inquiry and hearing.
It is submitted that such an indefinite contract
is not necessary for the operation of the school system and is for an unreasonable length of time. In
fact, the 1953 Act constitutes a legislative fjnding
that up to five years is what is necessary andreasonable.
.After the effective date of the 1953 Act- that
is, Februaiy 18, 1954, the board could have made
a five year contract with Appellant, but the Board,
instead, on March 29, 1954, chose not to make any
con tract with Mrs. Rees.
D. Any contract of the nature contended for by
Appellant extending beyond the school term was illusory
for want of mutuality of obligation.

Appellant's claimed "permanent" contract .
after a three year probationary period was illusory
for want of mutuality of obligation. Parenthetically,
it should be noted that this is the non-Federal issue
reserved by the Supreme Court in the case cited by ~
Appellant. State c.t; rcl. Andc1·son Y. Brand, 303
u.s. 95.
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Plaintiff here contends she was bound for one
year. It is clear that is all the Board was bound.
At the end of one year the Board elected not to renew her contract. This is a far different situation
than that in the Wyoming case, Tracy v. School
District No. 22, 243 P 2d 932, cited by Appellant.
In that case the Board had terminated the teacher's
employment during the school year, i.e., a discharge.
There was no obligation on the part of Appellant to teach beyond the one year term. There
is nothing expressly or impliedly in the contract
which bound her to teach beyond that specified time.
Therefore, as to any obligation of the Board to hire
her beyond the one year term, "it lacked the essential
element of mutuality of obligation and was terminable at will by either party". Price v. Western Loan
and Savings Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677. The same
rule is stated in 135 ALR 646 that where the employee furnishes no consideration additional to the
services incident to his employment, the agreement
amounts only to an indefinite hiring terminable
at the will of either party. As pointed out in Corbin
on Contracts, Section 96, such an agreement terminable at the will of either party is not an enforceable contract when made. All part performance by
the employee does is to create a unilateral contract
binding on the employer to pay the specified wages
for the actual period of employment.
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Therefore, quite aside from the power of the
Board to make the type of contract apparently contended for by Appellant, no enforceable agreement
was made beyond each year's term. As to the last of
such annual contracts, both parties have performed
in full and there is no liability for the Board's decision not to deal with Appellant further.
E.

No such contract as contended by Appellant

existed.

In Point I of her brief, Appellant claims the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the grounds she had shown a prima facie case of
tenure. It is submitted that the evidence which Appellant claims establishes such prima facie case
indicates quite the contrary.
'The contracts of employment themselves offer
no evidence of tenure. Each contract is only for one
year. There is nothing about the contract which
would indicate a continuing relationship beyond one
school year. Nothing is required of either party beyond the one year term prescribed. Each annual
contract is an integration of the agreement between
the Board and the teacher.
Each of the contracts for the first four years
Appellant was hired (R 6, 7, 8 and 9) contain in
paragraph 4 thereof a reference to "no discharge
without a thorough investigation and hearing before the Board." But the contract for the 1953-54
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school year (R 10), the last contract under which
Appellant was hired, has no such provision. The
paragraph 4 in the last contract provides, instead,
that the teacher has a right to terminate the contract on ten days written notice. Such a provision
does not indicate a contemplated lifetime relationship. Again, these paragraphs 4 of the earlier contracts refer only to discharge, and, as we have
pointed out, Appellant was not discharged.
Each contract of employment provides in Paragraph 1 thereof that the teacher agrees to be subject to the rules and regulations of the Board. The
only reference to tenure in the rules and regulations of the Murray Board of Education is that the
"tenure of office of all employees shall be at the
pleasure of the Board". ( R 19)
Appellant also relies for her prima facie case
of tenure on the correspondence and deposition of
Dr. James Clove, a former Superintendent of Murray Schools. Appellant refers to the statement in
the letter of Dr. Clove to all teachers, dated April
21, 1949, (R 22): "The Board of Education has
extended the probationary period of new teachers
from one year to three years to obtain tenure". In
taking Dr. Glove's deposition, Appellant attempted
to expand that statement into a contractual relationship, but Dr. Clove both on direct and crossexamination made it clear that he was talking not
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about "legal tenure", but about "professional tenure". (Deposition, pp. 7, 23, 24, and 27.) He also
made it clear that the employment of a teacher in
the Murray School District was on a year to year
basis. (Deposition, p. 31.) Professional tenure in
the mind of Dr. Clove so far as contract renewal
was concerned, meant no more than the question of
renewal of a teacher's contract after the probationary period was a matter for the Board of Education. It is merely a policy of indicating to teachers
that so long as they were doing work satisfactory
to the Board, they could expect to be rehired. The
Board still remains the final word on whether or
not the teacher will be offered a new contract.
In discussing the relationship of tenure to the
"Recommended Procedure for Orderly Dismissal of
'Teachers for Incompetency and Other Causes", proposed by a group of educators in 1947-1948, both
Dr. Clove, who was Superintendent at the time the
matter was first presented, and J. Easton Parratt,
the present Superintendent, are certain that no such
procedure was ever adopted by the Murray Board
of Education. (See Dr. Clove's deposition, pp. 25
and 28, and the deposition of Mr. Parratt, p. 50,
and the affidavit of J. Easton Parratt. R 18) No
record of such adoption appears in the Board's minutes. On the contrary, the affidavits of Board members and the depositions of the two superintendents
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indicate that the Murray Board has treated each
case on an ad hoc basis, and that no formal procedure was ever adopted. (See e.g., Clove deposition,
p. 3, lines 24-30; Parratt deposition, p. 13, line 3)
In addition, the Manual on Teachers' Security
prepared by the Utah Education Association in 1952
shows that the "Orderly Dismissal Procedure" was
not adopted in the Murray District. (Manual, pp.
18-20)
But quite aside from the meaning of tenure
as used in Dr. Clove's letter or as he believed tenure
should be, (Clove deposition, p. 28) it is quite clear
that no tenure policy applied to Appellant as she
was and is a married woman. The tenure policy,
whatever it was, was not applicable to Appellant as
she did not fall within the class of teachers encompassed by the policy.
In February, 1950, the Board of Education
adopted the fo1lowing resolution:
"The question of the continued employment of married women teachers was debated
by the board. The board agreed unanimously
that married women after three years probation teaching, if rehired must agree that
employment is on a year to year temporary
basis without attaining tenure." (Exhibit
"G" to the affidavit of J. Easton Parratt
R 19)
The effect of this resolution was reported to
all teachers by the letter of March 17, 1950 (Exhi23
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bit "C" of the affidavit of Parratt R 24), and was
incorporated in the contract transmitted by the
letter of March 19, 1950, covering the 1950-1951
school year (Exhibit "B", Parratt affidavit R 23),
and was referred to in item 6 of each contract for
the ensuing years. It is clear that from this resolution and the announcement to the teachers that no
tenure ·was implied in the contract offer which Mrs.
Rees accepted in 1950 and in subsequent years, as
she was a married woman. Therefore, plaintiff's
argument of implied contract arising out of the professional tenure policy of the Board falls, as the
offer was never made to her or to other married
women. Her married status was not the reason for
the Board's refusal to rehire her, but that is immaterial. The point is that the tenure policy had no
application to persons in her class.
II.
ING.

APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO A HEAR-

Appellant further complains at pages 26-28 of
her brief that the Board of Education did not give
her the hearing to which she claims she was entitled.
As support for her contention Appellant cites cases
from states which have tenure and dismissal procedure by statute. ,Of course, since Utah has no such
statute, these cases are inapplicable. In making her
contention, Appellant also overlooks these facts:
( 1) She was not di.scharged. All the Board of
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Education did was to decide not to renew her contract and so advised her.
( 2) The provision referring to investigation
and hearing in case of discharge contained in the
contracts of employment had been eliminated in the
contract in effect for the 1953-1954 school year.
That is the contract which was in effect at the time
and which governs the rights and obligations of the
parties.
(3) The Board granted Appellant an opportunity to be heard. (R 41) IIer counsel notified the
Board (R 63) that he had advised her not to attend
the special hearing called at her request. (R 41) By
refusing to attend such hearing, she waived any
rights to a hearing if any she had.
Since it is clear Appellant was not entitled to
a hearing under her written con tract, she claims
on Page 27 of her Brief that the Board is estopped
to deny the effect of Dr. Clove's letter of April, 1949,
or that the Board ratified such letter. In the first
place as we have shown, the Clove letter on "professional tenure" did not apply to married teachers
such as Appellant. In the second place the Board
cannot be estopped or be found to have ratified a
contract beyond its authority. In the third place the
facts show that the proposed "Dismissal Procedure"
was never taken up before the Board. (Clove deposition, pp. 25-28; Parratt affidavit, R 18 and 19)
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or that any hearing procedure was ever adopted
by the Murray Board of Education. (Parry Mfidavit, R 4'2-43; Day Affidavit, R 44-45) The record
shows that in the handling of the discharge of
teachers in Murray, each case was on an ad hoc
basis. (Clove deposition, p. 16; Parry and Day Mfidavits, R 42, 43, 44 and 45.) There can be no ratification of a procedure never considered by the
Board or applied by it in practice.
III. THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS.

As stated by Appellant at page 31 of her brief,
the gist of her claim in her second cause of action
is interference with contractual relations as outlined in Section 766 of the Restatement of Torts.
That section describes as a tort the inducement of a
third person either (a) not to perform a contract
with another, or (b) not to enter into or continue
a business relationship with another.
As has already been shown Appellant's only
contract with the Board was to serve for the school
term 1953-1954. This contract was fully performed
by both parties. Therefore, Sub-section (a) of Section 766 is not applicable.
As stated, 766 refers to inducing a third person.
In this case all the Board did was to advise Mrs.
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· Rees that it had decided not to enter into a contract
with her for the succeeding school year. The Board
members themselves are the ones charged by law
with the responsibility of making such determination. The corporate entity of the Board could act
only through its members. It is difficult to see how
those members making a determination in their official capacity could be liable in their individual
capacities for so determining, or inducing themselves to so determine. It is even more difficult to
see how the school board, as a corporate entity which
had no obligation to contract, could be liable for
not entering in to a con tract. No third person was or
could have been induced by the Board or its members, who were the very ones to do the contracting.
This is made clear by the court's refusal to dismiss as to the superintendent of schools and the
principal of the high school. Neither of these individuals were to contract with Mrs. Rees. Therefore,
if they, without privilege to do so, induced the Board
and its members not to enter into a new contract
for the 1954-1955 school year with Mrs. Rees, Section 766 of the Restatement might apply to them,
but certainly not to the Board or its members. The
individual members of the Board with respect to the
decision not to re-employ Mrs. Rees could act only
in their official capacity as members of the Board
and not as individuals. To hold otherwise, would
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tend to hinder elected board members from acting
on their judgment for the interest of the Board of
Education for fear of possible personal liability.
Members of a board of education are performing
a public service for an honorarium of $100.00 per
year. (Section 53-6-8, U.C.A., 1953) If they could
be held liable for their acts as Board members exercising their collective judgment as a Board whether
or not to re-employ a given teacher, the inducement
to enter such public service would be negated. To
impose liability in situations of this sort is against
public policy.
Furthermore, Appellant claims that all the
Board members conspired with each other to have
the Board not re-employ Mrs. Rees. The claim as to
"all" shows the absurdity of the situation. Even if
one member or a conspiracy of a minority, by false
representations, knowingly made to induce a majority to refuse to contract might incur liability for
wrongfully so inducing the majority, how could all,
who must make a decision, be liable for such deCision. Such a policy would substitute the judgment
of the court for the judgment of the Board as to
whether or not to make a particular contract. Such
is not the law in this State. Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P 2d 900; Allen v. Board of
Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756.
One other point should be made with respect
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to the second cause of action. It sounds in tort and
Appellant so characterizes it in her brief. Yet it is
well settled in this jurisdiction that a board of education is an instrun1entality of the state in the performance of a governmental function and consequently such board partakes of the State's sovereign immunity with respect to tort liability. Bingham v. Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 Utah
582, 223 P 2d 432; Woodcock v. Board of Education, 55 Utah 458, 187 P 181. As the Board members, in determining whether or not to employ Mrs.
Rees, are acting in the scope of their authority for
a governmental purpose such immunity from tort
liability applies both to the Board of Education as
a corporate entity and to its individua1 members.
See the annotation at 160 ALR 7, 32; 47 Am. Jur.,
Schools, § 60; Consolidated School District No. 1
v. Wright, 261 P. 953, (Okla., 1927).
CONCLUSION
The protection of the professional relationship
and employment security of teachers for which Appellant so eloquently argues can be acheived without
the necessity of contractual tenure. Murray, like
other school districts, had and continues to have a
policy of renewing the annual con tracts of teachers
without regard to their politics, religion, nepotic re29
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lationship or the availability of younger teachers
at a lower salary. (Parry Affidavit, R 42; Day
Affidavit, R 44; Parratt Affidavit, R 18; Clove
Deposition, pp. 27-28) Such a policy is not a contractual obligation of indefinite duration, but is a
policy to be applied in the discretion of the board
in light of its duties and responsibilities. It is the
position of the board here that it properly exercised
its discretion and its policy in making its decision
with respect to Mrs. Rees. It is further the position
of the Board that whether its judgment was correct
is not a question for which it is required to answer
in court.
Whether Mrs. Rees was or was not a good
teacher, whether or not the board was arbitrary in
dealing with her, whether or not the Board's judgment was correct that her "outside activities and
general attitude were unduly interferring with her
duties as a teacher" are not the issues here. The
sole issue is whether there was a binding contract
between the Board of Education and Mrs. Rees, entitling her to re-employment for the school year
1954-1955 and for succeeding years until she reached the age of 65.
It is submitted that on the law and undisputed
facts in this case no such binding contract existed.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
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lower court was correct and its judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
W. BILLINGS
Attorney for Respondents

PETER
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